Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

Norma D. Cox v. Cyril P. Thompson : Brief of the
Defendant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Stewart, Cannon & Hanson;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cox v. Thompson, No. 7796 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1687

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

FILE··::

STATE OF UTAH

DEC 2 7 1952

NORMA D. COX, ADMINISTRATRIX,
OF THE ESTATE OF JACKSON
BLAINE COX, DECEASED,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No.
779'6

CYRIL P. THOMPSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE DEFiENDANT

STEWART, CANNON & HANS:ON

By:

B. CANNON
J. HANSON
DoN J. HANsoN
ERNEST F. BALDWIN
EDWIN

REX

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
Nature Of The Case __________________ -------------------------------------------------------- 1
Facts _______ ----____ _________ ___ ________ ______ __ __ _______________ _____ __________ _________ ___ ____ ___ ____ 2
Statement Of Points _______________ ---------------------------________________________________ 13
Point No. 1. The presumption that deceased exercised
due care disappeared when the positive ·evidence
showed the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence. ---------------------------------- ___________ _____ ____ ___________ ____ ___ 13
Point No. 2. Under the evidence the decedent was
guilty of negligence as a matter of law.________________________ 18
Point No. 3. The casual connection between the negligence of the decedent and the accident is so patent
as t~ preclude the submission of that issue to a
jury. ____________________ ------_______ ____ _____ ___________________ ________ _______________ 28
Point No. 4. The evidence clearly shows that the doctrine of last clear chance could not be invoked and
could not, therefore, be submitted to the jury.____________ 32
Conclusion __________________ --------_____________ --_-------------- __ -----______ -----__ ---- ____ --__ 40
CASES CITED
Burgess v. Salt Lake City Railroad Company, 17 Utah 406,
53 P ac. 1013 ___________________________________________________________ --------___ __ __ ___ ___ 28
Compton et al v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 235 Pac.
( 2d) 515 --------------------------------------.-------------------------------------------.14-33
Fearn v. City of Philadelphia, 182 Atl. 534 .. -------------------------------- 19
Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P:ac. (2d) 630 ____________ 32-34
Heath v. Klosterman, 23 A. (2d) 209-------------------------------------------- 16
Heintz v. Southern Pacific Company, 147 Pac. (2d) 62L ___________ 17
Horton et al v. Stoll, 40 Pac. (2d) 603·---------~----------------------------- 22
Kent v. Ogden L. & Tr. Co., 5'0 Utah 328, 167 Pac. 666 ______________ 30
Malone v. Vining, 313 Mich. 315, 21 N. E. (2d) 144 ____________________ 19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IND·EX-Continued
Page
·Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah 369,
86 Pac. ( 2d) 37-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
Milligan v. Weare, 28 Atl. (2d) 463 .. ~-------------------:.·-----------------------· 31
Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495 .... -~--"-----13-20-32
Reid v.· Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 680·----------------------------- 23 ·
Sant v. Miller, 206 Pac. (2d) 719·----------~-~---·····--·-------------------------:. 20
Sheldon v. James, 166 Pac..8 __________________ .;......... --~----------------------------- 19
Trumbley v. Moore, 39 N. W. (2d) 613 .... ---------------------------~---------- 30
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express, 242 Pac. (2d)

764~-----

15

Tysinger v. Cobble Dairy Products, 36 S. E. (2d) 267. ____-___________ 21

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated 1943, Section 57-7-143(a) -------------------------- 18

AUTHORITIES
Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice,
Sec. 6127 _________________________________ . _______________ --·-___ . _. _--··- --~--- ----___ ~ ~----- --- 28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
NORMA D. COX, ADMINISTRATRIX,
OF THE ESTATE OF JACKSON
BLAINE COX, DECEA'SED,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No.
7796

CYRIL P. THOMPSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE DEF·ENDANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was instituted to reeover the damages for
the death of Jackson Blaine Cox, who was killed in an
auto-pedestrian accident within the city limits of Orem,
Utah, on U. S. Highway 91. This ap,peal is from the ruling of the lower court by the Honorable William Stanley
Dunford directing :a verdiet in favor of the .defendant because of the carelessness and negligence of the deceased
in crossing the highway in the face of ap·proa.ching traffic
at night and outside of a marked crosswalk.
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FACTS
As stated in Appellant's Brief, the accident occurred
on U. S. Highway 91 from 50 to .100 feet north of thE
corner of U. S. Highway 91 and Center Street. Ralph
A. Peters, Chief of Police of Orem City, one of the investigating officers, measured the distance from wher8
Mr. Cox's body was lying after the accident to the north
line of the sidewalk on the north side of Center Street
as 50 feet (R. 162-165, Tr. 147-150). Considering the
fact that the sidewalk on the north side of Center Street
is some distance north of the corner of Center Street and
Highway 91 and the fact that the body obviously was not
lying at the exact point where Mr. Cox was struck, the
actual distance would be somewhere around 75 or 80 feet.
To bett~r illustrate the general scene of the accident,
we are inserting a photostatic copy of Exhibit A referred
to and marked by the various witnesses. This map was
drawn to scale and stipulated to be correct by both parties with. the exception that the center lines dividing the
street are incorrectly shown. It was agreed by the parties that the center line~ were composed of two sets of
double lines with a neutral zone of three or four feet b~
tween the double lines (R. 2·5, 26- Tr. 9, 10). There was
no marked crosswalk at the place of the collision, nor at
the corner of U. S. Highway 91 and Center Street. Nor
was there any traffic control device for north-south bound
traffic at that corner. Center Street extends in an easterly direction from· U. ·s. Highway 91. Center Street
stops at Highway 91 and does not continue on on the west
side. There is a private gravel driveway opposite Center
2
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Street on the west side of Highway 91. There are two
lanes, each 12 feet "Tide, for traffic on each side- of the
higlnYay plus a "parking lane" approximately 24 feet
'vid~ on each side. The total width of the street is 96 feet
(Exhibit .A.).
The chain of events leading up to this accident is
as follows:
~Ir. and ~Irs. Cox and three other couples, Alma
and Ruth Ferre, Roy and Thelma Clark and Mayland
and Betty Russell had planned to attend an Eagles'
Dance at Provo, Utl;l,h (R. 22 - Tr. 6). Prior to going to
the dance they gathered at the Clark home at Orem, Utah,
at about 9 :00 or 9 :30 P.M. on Jal?-uary 20, ~951. According to Mrs. Clark, who served the liquor, e.ach me-mber
of the party had at least two drinks prior to leaving
. (R. 128 - Tr. 112). The couples left the Clark home at
about 10 :00 P.M. and went to the dance at the Federation
Room in Provo (R. 128 - Tr. 112). Mr. Cox, dece-ased,
took two pints of whiskey to the dance with him (R. 45.,
46, 47 - Tr. 29, 30, 31) which were consumed during the
course of· the evening, each party having at least two
n1ore drinks (R. 47, 64- Tr. 31, 48). After the dance, the
group returned to the Clark residence where they reInained about half an hour when they decided to go to the
Crown Cafe, which is located in the immediate vicinity
of the accident on the west side of Highway 91 in Orem,
Utah, (R. 65- Tr. 49) (Exhibit A).
Mr. and Mrs. Cox left the Clark home in the F:erre
automobile with ~{r. and Mrs. Ferre. The other couples
were to follow (R.. 22- Tr. 6). The Coxes and the Ferres
3
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arrived at the Crown Cafe at about 1 :00 A.M. (R. 23- Tr.
7). They went down into the basement where the lounge
of the cafe is located. Eight setups for mixed drinks
were ordered (R. 23- Tr. 7). When the two other couples
did not arrive, Mr. Cox grew impatient and decided to
go home. The Fe.rres and Coxes had left the lounge and
were outside the cafe when the other two couples drove
up in the Clark automobile (R. 23, Tr. 7).
Apparently all of the group, except Mr. Cox decided
to return to the cafe. Just as Mrs. Cox was entering
the cafe, M,rs. F·erre remarked to her, "Are you leaving?
Are you going~ Jack is leaving." (R. 40- Tr. 24). Mrs.
Cox turned and observed that Mr. Cox was proceeding
across Highway 91 toward the east and was six or seven
feet beyond or to the east of the double line in the center
of the street (R. 28- Tr. 12). His position on the highway
at that time is shown by the black circle east of the center
lines on Exhibit A. Mr. Cox was ap~parently on the way
to his horne, which is located five or six blocks away (R.
40 . . Tr. 24). At the time he was dressed in dark clothing,
a navy blue suit and a bluish gray top coat (R. 40; 41 Tr. 24, 25). Mrs. Cox called to him and ordered, "Come
on back. If you are going home, we will go in the car."
(R. 41- Tr. 25). Mrs. Cox saw Mr. Cox turn and start
back across the street. She had turned to open the car
door when she heard the screech of brakes. She did not
see the actual impa~t nor the car which struck her husband prior to the time he was struck (R. 241- Tr. 25).
Mr. Fe-rre vvas the only me·mber of the ·group with
Mrs. Cox, who claimed to see, the accident. He had enter4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ed the rafe for a second time after the Clarks and Russells arrived but had again stepped outside whe:n he
noticed his wife and the Coxes were not with hiln (R. 68 Tr. 52). He was standing at the point m·arked "XF" on
Exhibit .A. an~ claims to have observed Cox over the top
of an auton1obile, \Vhich was five feet high (R. 80, 81 - Tr.
64, 65). \\'hen the witness first saw Mr. Cox, Mr. Co~
''". as on his \vay from the other side of the road in about
the sa1ne position as when Mrs. Cox saw him, six or seven
feet east of the center lines down the middle of the· road
(R. 69- Tr. 53). The witness' attention was diverted for
a second or two (R. 69- Tr. 53). The ~ext thing he saw
was Mr. Cox flying through the air. He· places the pnint
of impact near the dividing line between the two southbound lanes of traffic at the point rnarked "XF" on Exhibit A. He did not se·e the automobile which struck Mr.
Cox prior to the impact (R. 74- Tr. 58).
Defendant, Cyril Thompson, and his two comp·anions,
Leon Wimber and Karl S.mith, were traveling to their
home in Springville, Utah from a basketball game. and
movie in Salt Lake· City (R. 243, 244- Tr. 228, 229). All
three were sitting in the front seat of the automobile,
the defendant on the left, Leon Wimber on the right and
Karl Smith in the middle (R. 244- Tr. 229). Leon Wimber testified that they were traveiling about 35 miles per
hour and then continued (R. 246 - Tr. 231) :

"Q.

And what did you

see~

A. I was watching the road ahead, and the
lane of traffic in which we were traveling. The
lights were on dim, because of the oncoming traffic. I saw a dark shadow step from the left hand
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side of the automobile, which was, in the east of
us., directly into our lights, from the side. He
stepped from the side into our lights.. I saw a
person move, from the· east to the we~t, into our'
lane of traffic.

Q. How would you describe .what you saw1
A.

I sa'Y a dark shadow, a dark object.

Q. Dark ohjeet, and. what form did it have, if
any~

.A.

My impression was that it was a man.

Q. Was it moving 'in either
A.

Yes.

Q. Which direction was he
A.

direction~

headed~

From east to wes.t.

Q. Did you observe what direction he was
looking~

A.

West.

Q.. And did you say he was moVIng from
eas.t to west~
A. Yes, ·he was moying in a westerly direction~

Q. Did he get -

was he in your lane of

traffic~

A.

He

move~d

into our lane of traffic.

Q. And how far did he get into your lane of
traffic, the l'ast you saw him there~
·
A. Half way across, approximate~y.
Q. Do you have any judgment as to how far
ahead ~e app·e'ared to be, how far ahead of the
car~

6
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...\.. I thought at the time it was probably 15
feet ahead of the car."
Continuing on page 248 (Tr. 233):
hQ. Now what if anything did the car do
that you 'vere in, or that you observed that Cyril ·
Thompson do, 'vith respect to the car~

A.

The car swerved sharply to the east.

Q. Did you see or hear an impact of any
kind!

A.

I saw an impact.

Q. And will you describe that to the, best of
. your ability f State where it was and-.
A. When I first saw the man, he was to the ·
left of the front of the car, and as we swerved, it
brought the right fender nver to where he was at,
and he hit right aqout where the light and the
hood came in contact there, and rolled up o;ver the
right fender, partly on .the hood, off of the fender
and down to the side, immediately in front of myself.
Q. And was the point of impact within your
lane of traffic~
·
A. It was.
Q. I believe you said that he· had got to
about the middle of your lane, or somewhere in
there~

A. That's right.
Q.· When this occurred, were you observing
the two lines on either side ·o:f your lane of traffic~
A.
Q.
A.

Ahead of us, I was.
Could you see those~
Yes."
7
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Karl 'Smith testified that he looked up just as the car
in which he was riding started to swerve and that there
was a pedestrian about 15 feet in front of them. "He appeared to be in the middle .of the southbound lane, and at
the time of theimpact, it just seemed to pick him up and
just drop him off to the side- of the center." (R. 270- Tr.
255). He te~stified that the automobile was traveling
south in the lane marked "2" on Exhibit A and that the
are:a around the cafe at the place o~ the accident was
"pretty dark.'' (R. 27 4- Tr. ·259).
Cyril Thompson, the defendant, testified he was
driving his stepfather's Hudson automobile on the trip
from Salt Lake to Springville. He and his companions
left Salt Lake at approximately 12:30 A.M. (R. 281- Tr.
266). He observed the single line ·on his left separating
traffic lanes and estimates that this left line was two to
three feet from the automobile ( R. 285, 288, 304 - Tr. 270,
273, 289). His testimony concerning what he saw and did
is as follows (R. 286 - Tr. 271) :

"Q. Well, what was the first thing you did
see that caused you any - caused you concern, if
anything~

A. Well, I was just driving down the road,
weren't saying anything, just driving, and I seen
this- well, I seen Mr. Cox now. I seen him when
he ste~pped into the lights. And that is the first
time I seen him.
Q. ·what lights do you have reference to?

A. The headlights on the car. He stepped
into the lane, where the lights go the strongest,
down the center of the lane.
8
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Q. \Vl1ieh direction was he going'
A. He was heading across the street west.
Q. Did you see him at any time facH the car~
A. No, I couldn't see him. All I could see
after I did see him was a silhouette. There was
no form there at all, just a dark silhouette.
Q. When you first saw this silhouettH in
front of you, I ·will ask you how far ahead of you
it was, appeared to be, ·~s far as. your vision was
concerned~

A. Well, I could see the full length of him,
and possibly-. probably two or three feet of highway. I couldn't specify as to how much highway,
but I could see the full height of the man.
Q. Was he on the move, or was he standing
still, or do you know~
A. Well, his legs were apart, I could see and I never seen him until he came into view into
the lights from the side.
Q. Now prior to the time you saw him, whe:e
were you looking~
A~ I was looking straight ahead, down the
road.
Q. Could you see your lane of traffic~
A. Yes.
Q. Could you see the entire lane of traffic~
A. Yes.
Q. Was there anything there prior to the
time he e·ntered your lane~
A. Nothing. I couldn't see anything in the
lane at ·all.
Q. Was he on the move when you saw.him~
9
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A. Yes, he had entered in from the side of
the lights, and that is the first time I seen him
was when he ste:p·ped into the light there.

Q.

Could you tell which direction he was

headed~

A.

He was headed west.

Q. And what did you do if anything when
you s:aw him~
·
A. Well, I could se:e· him stepping to the
west, so I immediately swerved the car to the east,
which would have been my left.

Q. Were your hands on the wheel during this
time.~
· A.

Yes.

Q. Had they been on the wheel prior to the
time you swerved~

A. Yes.
Q. And did you do anything else, other than
swerve your car~
A. Well, at the same time I swerved, I prob. a;bly dep,ressed the clutch at the· same time. It all
happened at the same time. I swerved, depressed
the clutch, ·and applied the brakes a small amount.
I don't think I applied them all, completely, because of the force of stopping and turning too, it
didn't seem reasonable.

Q. You did apply your brakes, you put your
foot on the brakes~
A.

Yes.

Q.

As soon as. you could~

A. ·Yes."

10
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The physical facts of the accident are illustrated l:.y
Exhibit . A. and the testin1ony of Ralph H; Peters, OrePl
City Chief of Police, "\vho testified that he was inside the
Orem Fire Station of the Orem -City Hall (Exhibit A,
R._ 159 163 - Tr. 1-±±, 1±S). He was facing west and looking toward U.S. Highway 91. His attention was directed
to the defendant's automobile as it swerved, ('R. 172- Tr.
157). He stated that he· could see both headlights as the
car swerved but was unable, at that time, to tell what had
occurred (R. 160 - Tr. 145). He, together with Officer
Cook got into the police car and drove out on the highway.
As he left the entrance of the fire station and turned to-.
ward the highway, he saw 1\{r. Cox lying on the highway
with Mrs. Cox bending over him (R. 172- Tr. 157).
He stated that Mr. Cox was. lying ap·proximately on
the line separating the first two southbound lanes of traffic (R. 161 - Tr. 146) 50 ·feet north of a perpendicular
line drawn across U. s. Highway 91 fron1 the north side
of the sidewalk on the north of Center Street; (R. 162, 199
Tr. 147, 184) at the point where the red circle appear~ on
Exhibit A. (R.166- Tr. 151).
Small pieces of chrome from the headlights of
defendant's car were found three to five feet north of
Mr. Cox's body, shown by the two blue "X's" in the second
lane west of the center .highway on Exhibit A. Defendant's car stopp·ed on the east side of the· highway in front
of the City Hall vvhe,re the red rectangle appears on Exhibit A (R. 169·- Tr. 154). The distance from the pieces
of chrome to the front of defendant's. car at the point
where it stopped is 67 feet (R. 17?- Tr. 161). The center

11
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of·damage to the car driven by the defendant was on the
right front between the headlight and radiator (R. 188
Tr. 173).
Officer Peters noted that Mr. Cox's breath smelled of
intoxicating liquor and that he was wearing dark clothing
(R. 171- Tr. 156). The witness testified that the-re was a
dark spot encompassing that general area of the. highway
where the accident occurred (R. 171 - Tr. 156). The tire
marks of defendant's automobile commenced in lane two
on Exhibit A and extended across the highway to the
east (Exhibit A, R. 174 - Tr. 159). In the officer's opinion, hased upon the physical evidence, the defendant'R
automobile could not have been traveling over 35 miles
per hour (R. 178- T·r. 163).
Police Officer Cook, who assisted Officer Peters
testified that he had observed the general area of the
highway where the accident occurred on several occasions. and that when the large neon sign of the Crown
Cafe is out, there is a dark area in the highway where this
accident occurred (R. 213, 216 - Tr. 198, 201).
Howard R. Jacobsen, Fire Chief at Orem, testified
that Mr. Cox, after the accident, was lying across the line
dividing the two s.outhbound lanes of traffic with his feet
in the second lane (R . 222 - Tr. 207).
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court directed
a verdict for the defendant. The court's aetion was not ·
error, as. contended by appellant, for the foregoing reasons.

12
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
Po·i:nt No. 1. The presumption that deceas.ed exe·reised due care disappeared when the positive evidence
showed the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence.
Point No. 2. Under the evidence, the decedent was
guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
Point No. 3. The causal connection between the
negligence of the deceased and the accident was so patent
as to preclude the submission of that issue to a jury.
Point No. 4. The evidence clearly shows that the
doctrine of last clear chance could not be invoked and
could not, therefore, be submitted to the jury.

POINT NO. 1
The presumption that deceased exercised due care
disappeared when the positive eviden~e showed the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence..
In Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495, ·
the evidence was that the deceased and his wife were
crossing 13th East Street in the vicinity of Westminste:r
Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah. His wife testified that
as "they step~ped off the curb and started easterly across
Thirteenth East Street, decedent was to her left or north;
that he looked neither to his left nor right, but looke·d
straight ahead as they proceeded across the street; th·a:t
he said nothing to her -~bout ap-proaching traffic; that
she did not hear or see defendant's automobile until it
struck; and that they had proceeded about a quarter of
the '\vay (about 10 feet) across the street when they were
13
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struck." A verdict was directed against the deceased's
heirs and .the verdict was attacked, as here, . on the
ground, among others, that the de~e·dent was entitled to a
presumption that the deceased exerc1sed due care for his
own safety. The court he~d:
"Plaintiff relies on an asserted presumption
that deceased was, at the time of his injury, in the
exercise of due care for his own safety. It is true
that in certain death cases, there is a presumption that decedent was in the exercise of due care
for his own. safety. But there is no room for such
a presumption where, as here, there was positive
evidence not only as to the. fatal aooident its.elf,
but to the conduct of decedent leading up to the
fatal accident. Such a presumption 1nust give way
to the positive evidence adduced."
None of the cases cited in Appellant's Brief contradict this proposition of law. In Compton, et al v. Ogden
Union Ry & Depot Co., (Utah) 235 Pac. (2d) 515, a Mrs.
Laws was with the deceased at the time she was- killed and
te~stified of her actions up to the time of her death. The
deceased was killed by a train while crossing a railroad
track and the evidence showed that prior to crossing,
she had an unimpaired view of the railroad tracks for
300 feet. The court dismissed plaintiff's case and the presumption of due care was argued on appeal. The court
held as set out in pJaintiff's. brief:
"The presumption is applicable where there
is no e~vidence· as to care used, or perhaps where
the evidence comes from an adverse witness who
may be subject t~, disbelief by the jury, or where
there is sufficient uncertainty in the, evidence as
to cast doubt on the testimony."
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The court then continued, which is not set out in Appellant's Brief:
~~It has no application where, as here, the de-ceased is obserYed during the period p,rior to and
at the time she is fatally injured and the witness
is available and testified."
In Tuttle v. PacifiC Intermountain. Express, (Utah
1952), 2-±2 Pac. (2d) 764, the Judge did instruct the jury
that, in the absence qf evidence to the contrary, the deceased 'vas presumed to use due care for his own p·rotection. Two of the three concurring justices were of the
opinion that the presumption had been destroyed by evidence of the deceased's conduct, and that giving the instruction could only confuse the jury, but decided the
error was not prejudicial. Justice Crockett, · the third
concurring justice, thought the p-resumption ap·plicahle
but only because there was no evidence of deceased's conduct. Quoting Justice Crockett:
"The jury's verdict for the plaintiff plainly
shows that they did not believe the deceased was
going southward, but on the contrary their finding
was that he was coming north. Under these circumstances, there is no evidence whatsoever regarding his conduct just preceding his death."
It is elementary that presumptions are of evidentiary
value only and must give way to p·ositive evidence to
the contrary, as this co-urt held in the ·Mingus case, supra.
They control only where there is no evidence to the contrary.
In the case at bar, the uncontradicted testimony of
all the witnesses, which will be covered in greater detail
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In the next section, was that the deceased had crossed
over on the east side of Highway 91 at a point where
there was no cross walk, marked or otherwise, and that
he then turned, started back across the road and walked
directly into the path of defendant's automobile. Only
one conclusion can be drawn from this testimony, and
that is that decedent was completely oblivious of defendant's approaching car, having either failed to look for
defendant's car or to see what was to be se·en.
This is corroborated by the undisputed physical
facts testified to by the investigating officer, which established that the deceased had completed crossing the
southbound lane of traffic nearest the center and was
cro-~sing the s.econd or defendant's lane of travel when
struck. Damage to the right front of the car, the skid
marks and the testimony of the eye witnesses show that
Mr. Cox was s:truck as the car swerved southeasterly to
miss him, his body being carried up o:ver the hood and
coming to rest on· the marked line~ between the two southbound lanes of travel next west of the center zone.
Chrome from the grille was found after the impact just
north and a little west of the body in the second southbound lane from the center. The· skid marks for 67 feet
showed defendant was not exceeding the 40 mile speed
limit and probably not exceeding a maximum of 30-35
miles per· hour.
In Heath v. Klosterman, 23. A. (2d) 209 (Penn.), the
decedent was struck and killed by a truck as he alighted
from his parked car. _Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal, the court holding decedent guilty of
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negligence as a 1natter of law. Discussing the presumption of due e;are, the court said:
"Even though Doctor Heath is dead and ordinarily a presumption might arise that he exercised due care, this p·resumption is destroyed in
the instant case by the testimony adduced by
plaintiff. As held in Watkins v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 315 P·a. 497, a presumption such as, this is not
evidence, and it cannot be weighed as evidence,
since, it gives way the moment p~roof to the contrary· is presented. This conclusively appeared
in the presentation of plaintiff's own case, for the
evidence established .that Doctor Heath did not
look. l\Ioreo-ver, the accident having happened in
broad daylight, he must have seen the trucks had
he looked before stepping out. There can be no
presumption as against facts whieh are p:roven."
In Heintz v. Southern Pacific Company, (Cal.) 147
Pac. (2d) 621, the decedent drove his automobile into a
freight car which was parked on a siding. The lower
court granted a motion for a non-suit which was a:ffirmed
on appeal. In discussing the presumption of care which
was raised by the ap·p-ellant, the court said :

"The ap~pellants, however, rely on the presumption that the deceased exercise·d due care for
his own safety and argue that thi's P'resumption
is sufficient to raise a question of fact for the jury.
They go so far as to argue that this p·resumption
'declares that whatever the decedent may or may
not have done he was not negligent.' This argument. overlooks the well established rule that this
presumption of due care is dispelled and disappears from the case when a fact which is wholly
irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontra-.
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dieted testimony produced by the party relying on
the presumption.

"* * * Where the

app~ellant's

own evidence
clearly establishes .that the deceased was familiar
with this crossing, that the fruit car wa:s- visible
and should have been seen· by any driver who was
exe·rcising any care at all, and where there was
ample room to pass on either side of the fruit car,
even if rHasonable care was belatedly used .. Under
the circumstances here ap·pearing, we think any
presumption of due care was dispelled :t>Y the facts
clearly prorved by the appellants, that under those
facts the deceased was guilty of -contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the trial court
correctly so held."
This defendant earnestly contends that the presumption of due care in the in·stant case was dispelled by the
evidence of all the witnesses that decedent did· nothing
other than walk directly into the path of defendant's
automobile, completely· unaware that there was any auto,..
mobile. It cannot be said that he· exercised due care when
the positive facts show so clearly that he did not ..

POINT NO.2
__ Under the, ·evidence· the· decedent was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
_··Title 57-7-143 (a) Utah Code A'YI!notated 1943, as
amended, provides:
.
"(a) Eve~ry person crossi~g a roadway at
any point other than within a marked crosswalk
or within an unmarked cros!swalk at an intersection shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon. t h e roadway. "

It is clear that as soon as decedent left the cente·r
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of the high,Yay and proceeded directly into the path of
southbound traffic, he failed in his duty to yield the- right
of ,yay as provided by law... His failure to a:ct in this
regard was negligence of a most apparent kind, and it is
readily seen that had he not continued his course the
accident would :not have occurred.
In Fearn v. City of Philadelphia, (Pa.) 182 AtL 534,
the court said :
~,,,7 hen a pedestrian trave-rses a street between intersections, since he is not crossing ·at a
place where he is expected to be, he must exercise
a higher degree of care for his safety; motorists
are correspondingly held to a less degree of care.~'

.

See also Sheldon v. James, (Cal.) 166 Pac. 8, where
the court said :
"A greater degree of care is necessary upon
the part of the pedestrian who unde·rtakes to cross
a congested highway other than at the established
crosswalk and especially so if in the act he does
not essay a direct crossing, hut. pursues a long .
diagonal route.
"The observation of ordinary care by such
a pedestrian is not. fully performed ~y merely
looking to the left or right as he steps upon the
street. The observance of that care 'is imperative
.upon him during all of the time that he is crossing."
The Supreme Court. of Michigan in Malone v. Vining,
313 Mich. 315, 21 N:· E. (2d) 144, aptly defined the duty
of pedestrians as. follows:
. "Under present-day traffic conditions a pedestrian, before crossing a street or highway,
rnust (1) make proper observation as to a.pproach-
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ing traffic, ( 2) observe ap.proaching traffic and
form a judgment as to its distance away and itB
speed, (3) continue his observations while crossing the street or highway, and (4) e~xercise that
degre·e, of care and caution which an ordirrarily
prudent person would exercise under like circumstances.''
The evidence conclusively shows that the decedent
did not exercise the degree of care of a reasonably prudent person. It naturally and logically follows that such
heedless and inattentive conduct was negligence as a
matter of law. Numerous courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, in similar situations, have so held.
In Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495,
a directed verdict was sustained on the grounds of plaintiff's contributory negligence. In ·concluding that the
plaintiff either did not look or did not make sufficient
or ad~quate observation, this court said:
"More convincing than the direct testimony
that deceased did not look, is the further evidence
that deceased neither said nor did anything to in- .
dicate that he was at all aware of the danger presented by defendant's approaching automobile·.
He seems to have been wholly unaware of its approach. Certainly he did nothing either to warn
his wife, nor to rescue either himself or her from
their position of peril. On this evidence, it must
be said as a matter of law that deceased either
failed to look, or having looked, failed to see· vvhat
he should have seen."
In Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719,
plaintiff and his. wife _were crossing the main street of
Logan, Utah, from east to west at a point between inter20

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sections. They stopped so1newhere over the center of
the high,v-ay on the \Yest side of the street to allow southbound traffic to pass. Plaintiff \vas gazing in a southwesterly direction \Vhen defendant's automobile, . approaching from the north struck the plaintiff and injured
hiln. Plaintiff~s \Yife had seen the impending danger
and had stepped out of the way. Verdict was directed in
fayor of defendant by the lower co.urt and affirmed on
appeal, the court saying:
"Appellant was aware of the fact that he was
taking a chance in crossing the street at a place
contrary to law. ~He should also have known that
a driver of a vehicle would not ordinarily anticipate the presence of pedestrians on the street at
the time and place of the accident. Knowing th·at
his presence might not be anticip·ated and knowing
that traffic on the west side of the road was approaching from the north and with nothing of
importance to distract his attention, it was ap·pellant's duty to watch the traffic he knew was approaching his location.·

"* * * ·Having omitted to continue to watch,
he failed to exercise the degree of care required
of ·a pedestrian who leaves a place of safety and
places himself in a position of peril. A greater
degree of care is necessary up·on the part of a
pedest.rian who undertakes to cross a city street at
a prohibited place than is placed on one who
uses a marked crosswalk."

Tysinger v. Cobble Dairy Products, (N.C.) 36 S. E. (2d)

267:
"Now, then, as to the alleged contributory
negligence of plaintiff's testate, it is sufficient to
say that in crossing the highway at a point other
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than a marked crosswalk at an intersection it was
his duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles
upon the highway. G.S. Sec. 20-174 (a). The highway was visible according to all the evidence, for
at least 300 yards in. the direction from which the
truck of the. defendant was approaching. And in
leaving the point where he was talking to the witness. Everhardt to go toward his home, he necessarily faced in the direction of the oncoming truck.
He must have seen the truck and taken the chance
of crossing or, have 'been inattentive to the duty
imposed upon him by law, and started across without looking for vehicles on the highway. In either ·
event, a reading the evidence leads to the conclusion as a matter of law, that his own conduct contributed to his injury and death, unfortunate and
regrettable as it may be."
In Horton, et al v. Stoll, (Cal.) 40 P·ac. (2d) 603,
plaintiff, a twenty-year old girl, was crossing between
intersections. not in a pedestrian lane. As she came to
the further west car track, first rail, she hesitated and
looked or glanced to the north, but failed to remember
what, if anything, she saw. She was under t~e impression, howe,yer, that she.had plenty of time to cross the
street. After taking a s.te.p or so, and while she, was still
on the car track, she was hit by the left front fender
of defendant's car coming from the north. In sustaining
a non-suit, the: court said:
."We are of the· opinion that the facts of this
case show affirmatively that plaintiff failed to use
due ·care and that she failed in this· respect was
the proximate cause of the injury.
"Had she looked she must have see·n defendant's car approaching a few feet away, for she· had
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taken only a step or two from her position of
safety when she was struck.
·
''It was plaintiff's duty from the position she
was in upon the highway to yield to.· defendant the
right of way.
"The only conclusion that can be reached fron1
the evidence is that plaintiff failed to take the
trouble to properly look for automobiles on the
side of the street as she crossed, or that she saw
. the automobile and for some unexplained reason
stepped directly in its path. Under either theory
she failed to use due care, which precludes her
rights of recovery."
In Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 680, this
court in holding plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law said:
"A case very similar to the instant case is
Andrus v. S. J. Boudreaux & Son, La. Ap~p·. 158
·so. 679. There the plaintiff was foreman of about
twelve men engaged in· roadwork, about half of
them being on each side of the road, but not on the
paved portion, ·as defendant's truck ap·proached.
The paymaster -had just pulled up his car across
the road from the plaintiff who procee-ded to cross
the road diagonally to the p·ayrnaster's car. The
plaintiff testified he did not see defendant's truck, .
but the court noted a probable inference that he
·saw it fro·m the fact that he had 'walked unusually
fast, rushed or run.' But this was immaterial as
the court found: 'The on-coming truck was in full
open view of the road and.was bound to have be~en
seen by the plaintiff had he looked down the road
at the time of starting across.' The court then held
the plaintiff to the knowledge he would have had if
he· had looked and held: 'It was his duty to look
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for his safety before starting across.- He must be
regarded as having seen the truck whHther he
looked or not'; and the court approved the holding of the lower court that plaintiff was guilty of ·
contributory ne-gligence a.s a matter of law. 'He
should not ·have thus voluntarily, heedlessly, and
thoughtlessly left a S'afe place and exposed him:self to an obvious danger by trying to cross the
road under the circumstances which attended such
a movement.'
"As the court said in Andrus v. S. J. Boudreaux & Son, supra, he was chargeable with what
he would have se·en had he looked. He either proce-eded without looking or, having seen the approaching car, he chanced crossing in face of the
hazard. The latte-r would clearly, under the circumst'ance~s, have been negligence on his part. The
approaching vehicle· was at the instant of deceased's entry onto the pavement so ne·ar that no
p-rudent person would attempt crossing in front
· of it. The more ·reasonable inference is he did not·
see the. car. But had he looked he would have seen
it, and he is charge~d with knowledge of what he
would have seen had he the duty to look. We
think that he. clearly had such duty.

•

•

*

"The' presence of the barriers. on the untraveled portion of the highway and of piles of
dirt on the side· of the P'Rve·ment, and the presence
of workmen, would not justify deceased in assuming that the driver of a vehicle will, because of the
presence of these elements, so ~rive as to avoid
striking one who, without looking, darts out into
the path of the vehicle. We conclude: that unde~·
the evidence viewed most :favorably to the plaintiffs the deeeased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.''
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Appellant in analyzing the deceased's conduct asks
the court to indulge in conje-cture and ·speculation and to
assmne a set of facts not supported .by, but contrary to
the evidence, that is, that defendant stop-ped before crossing in front of defendant and that. the defendant deliberately turned and ran deceased down.
Appellant cites the testimony of Mr. Ferre as evidence that the impact occurred in the first and not the
second lane for traffic southbound on the highway. Such
a conclusion is not warranted by his testimony. Mr.
Ferre \Yas observing the scene from the side of the road
over the top of a five foot automobile (R. 81 - Tr. 65).
He did not see defendant's car ·p·rior to the impact~ Nor
did he keep his eyes constantly on deceased (R. 69 - Tr.
53). He saw the flash of the impact (R. 75 ~ Tr. 59),
heard the glass· or the headlight break and saw Mr. Cox
go through the air and land on the ceme·nt (R. 71 - Tr. ·
55). He places the point of impact in the vicinity ·of the
line dividing the two lanes for southbound traffic (R.
70 - Tr. 54). Considering the limited observation of the
witness and that he was observing from a point off to
the side of the road over t~e top. of anotheT automobile,
such a point can only be an approximation. That point
is approximately in the· same place as te:stified to by othe~r
witnesses and as .illustrated by the physical evidence.
Nor should we, in our consideration·s, · lose sight of
the real negligence of the deceased, which is that decedant walked directly into the path of defendant's automo-bile completely unaware of the -approach of that automobile which was there to be seen. There is nothing in
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Mr. Ferre'.s te,stimony contrary to this. In fact, that is
his testimony. .On p~ge 69 of the record, he testified as
follows. (Tr. 53) :

"Q.

Now did you watch Mr. Cox· at that

time~

A. Yes.
Q. · And what did you see·~
A. He was on his way hack, and I seen the
·point of impiaet.
Q. Did .you watch him all the way hack~
A. Well; there might have been a second or
two there I never p·aid much attention to.it.
Q. Now could you see. Mr. Cox from where
you were·, when he was out in the road there~
A. .Yes, very good."
On p;age 75 of the record (Tr. 59), Mr. Fie.rre. testified:
"Q. Then I assume you didn't watch during
the interval·you saw Mr. Cox over here, until the
time of imp:act, that y~u just saw the impact~
A. Oh, I seen Jack a.s·he was on hi:s way back
to the point of impuct.
. Q. Then you didn't se,e. anything, and the
next thing you s.aw was the· flash of the impact as
it occurred~
·
A. That's right.
Q. During fhat inte:rval, you didn't. see him,
during that short interval,· between the time~ you
last 'Saw him and the impact·~
A. Well, I was watching Jack coming."
1

Leon Wimber testified that Mr. .Cox was walking
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from the east to the west and was looking to the west
(R. 246- Tr. 231). He-testified Mr. Co_x was two or three
feet into the lane in which defe·ndant was driving when he
first noticed him and had continued to·walk to ap~p~roxi
nlately the middle of the lane when the accident occurred
(R. 262, 264- Tr. 247, 249).
Cyril Thon1pson testified that decedent was moving
to the west at the-time defendant first saw him (Tr. 286Tr. 271).
The testimonY of all these. witnesses is substantiated
by the physical evidence.
The evidence is that defendant had consumed a considerable amount of intoxicating liquor.· The evidence
further.shows that Mrs. Cox had p.reviously divorced her
husband on the ground of habitual drunkenneS's ~and that
this was his first spree since D.ecember 29, 1950. It is
not contended that decedent wws drunk or that intoxication alone was a cause of the accident. But the defendant
does urge that this evidence should be· considered· in determining the question of deceased's ne~gligence, and certainly this evidence tends to explain decedent';s overall
lael{ of care ·and inattentiveness.
Appellant is correct in the assertion that the court
should direct a verdict only in clear ca.s.es,_ but in vi~w of·
all the evidence, the <)nly conclusion upon which rea'sonable minds could agree in this case is. that decedent, with
a clear and unobstructed view of oncoming traffic for at
least 500 yards (R. 66 - Tr. 50), f'ailed to yield the right
of way to defendant's automobile, failed to observe the
automobile or to hee<l the same, and walked directly into
its path, thereby caus~ing his own d~ath.
. 27
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POINT NO.3
The causal connection between the ne·gligence of the
deeede!nt and the accident is s-o p~atent as to preclude the
submission of that issue to a jury.
Appellant contends that even though decedent was
negligent, the question of whether such negligence contributed to his injuries was a question for the jury..
In Se:c. 6127 _of Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law OJnd Prac-tice, it is stated:
"Although one may be under the duty to look
before cros:sing a city street, if he is injured by an
automobile while crossing -and would escape the
consequences of his negligence, he must show that,
even if he had looked, the accident would still have
happened.''
If Mr. Cox had paid heed to what was to be seen he
would not have placed himself in a position of peril. He
would not have. left his place of safety on the east. side of
the highway and walked to the west directly in front of
the oncoming vehicle. The fact is, as testified to by the
witnesses, .the decedent walked into the point of impact ·
ap~parently oblivious to the imminent peril to which he
subjected himself, and certainly under that state of f'acts
it cannot be said tha.t the ·accident would have happened
even if decedent had exercised the requisite degree of
care.
In Burgess v. Salt Lake City Railroad Compa.ny, 17
Utah 406, 53 Pac. 1013, plaintiff in crossing Second South
between Main and West Temple Streets looked for westbound ·Street cars, but failed to look for an eH:stbound car
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and "~as injured '"'hen he stepped in front of the l'a.tter.
There 'Yas some evidence that at the. place of the injury,
there '"'ere flagstones laid flush 'vith the p·aving blocks
indicating a crossing and also evidence that pedestrians
crossed the street at any place between Main and West
Temple. The court reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff and reinanded the case for a new trial. In holding
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law under the evidence, the court said, starting on page
±10 of the lJtah Report: ,
·'On the other hand, the evidence shows that
the plaintiff incautiously and heedlessly ste1pp·ed
upon the track, where he received the injury. In
the hurry of the moment, he attempted to cross. the
street and track without exercising that care which
a man of ordinary prudence ought to exercise ·
under like circumstances. Had he but used his
senses it is clear that he could have avoided the
accident. This it was his duty to do; and, having
failed so to do, he cannot he heard to compl'ain of
any injury that resulted from the failure which
was the proximate cause thereof.
"The plaintiff, in crossing the street, was
bound to exercise the S'arne degree of care as that
which it was incumbent upon the railway company
to exercise.
"The car has the right of way in case of meeting a person or vehicle on the track, but each
p~arty, in order to avoid accident, is bound to exercise ordinary care, and such reason·able p~rudence
and precaution as the surrounding circumstances
may require."
In Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah 369,
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86 Pac. (2d) 37, a directed verdict in. favor of defendant
was affirmed on the grounds that plaintiff was held guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in standing
in a pedestrian lane, but so close to a passing bus that
the overhang of the bus when turning struck her. The
court on page 380 of the Utah Report quoted Kent ·v.
Ogden L. & Tr. Co., 50 tJtah 328, 167 Pac. 666:
"When, as in this: case, there can be·no doubt
whatever regarding the p,roximate cause of the
accident, nor any doubt that it was wholly within
the power of the deceased at any moment before
the collision to have averted it by 1nerely n1oving
a foot or two out of the zone of danger, this court
cannot shirk its duty in determining the res:ult.
* * * The deceased's inexcusable conduct constituted the pT'oximate cause: of the injury."

v.

In Trumbley
Moore, (Neb.) 39 N:W. (2d) 613,
plaintiff ·was crossing a street between intersections when
struck by the defendant's vehicle. The evidence showed
.tlu1t the wheels of the vehicle were straddling the center
line of the road. A verdict for the plain tiff in the lower
court was reverse~d on .aprpeal. r:rhe cour~ said:
"It is true that the left whee~ls of the Hame-r
car went over the center line, but there is no'thing
to indicate that this was the proximate caus-e of
plaintiff's injury~ The pro~imate cause of the
injury wa;s the atte1npt of plaintiff to cross· the
street between intersections without looking, or if
he did look, in not seeing that which was in plain
sight. * * * The evidence reveals nothing vvhich
would excuse plaintiff's. failure to see the Ha1ner
car and respect the right of ·way that it had. A
right of way means nothing unle1ss persons obliged
to respect it are required to see: an app·roaching
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favored ear that is in plain sight. Plaintiff was
negligent in attemp~ting to cross the street between
intersections as he did. Negligence on the part of
the defendant Hamer is not shown by this record.
Under such circumstances plaintiff's own negligence is the proximate cause of the accident and
there is nothing for a jury to determine. The trial
court should have directed a verdict for the defendants."

In 1llilligan v. Weare, (Maine), 28 Atl. (2d) 463,
plaintiff sought to reco;ver for personal injuries sustained
when defendant's car driven by his employee knocked
him down as he was crossing a highway. The point of
the three lane highway at which the accident occurred
was an intersection which was marked with stop lights.
Since traffic waiting .for the lights was blocking the
crosswalk, plaintiff walked between cars and into the
center lane, which "'. .as reserved for left turning, and· into
the path of defendant's. rapidly approaching automobile.
The court held :
"By his own admission the plaintiff. without
.warning walked through a line. of cars which, until
.he emerged, obscured his moveJll_ents and step~ped
out into the center lane of a main highway in
front of a· rapidly moving automobile which must
have been in plain view but wa.s not seen by him.
* * * We are convinced that he either did not look
at all to his left or if he did he was so inattentive
that he failed to observe the dange-r which threatened hiin and take available precaution~ for his
own safety. He gave the drive~r of the app~:voaeh- .
ing car no time or opportunity to -avoid the collision. It was his orwn ne~gligence which "\Vas the
proximate cause of his injuries."
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In view of the aforementioned authorities, it is plain
that when a person attempts t'O cross a highway and the
evi!dence taken most favorably in his behalf shows that
he heedlessly walked into the p·ath of an oncoming· ve. hicle, he has failed to exercise re'asonable care, and that
failure is at least a contributing factor in hi:s injuries.
That p-rinciple can have no greater ap~plication than to
the case at bar.
POINT NO. 4
The evidence clearly shows that the doctrine of last
clear chance CJould not be invoked and could not, there·fore, be s.uhmitte:d to the jury~
The doctrine of last clear chance has no application
to a case where, 'a;s he~re, the defendant's negligence continues up 'to the event out of which the damage or injury
arises. We quote the example given l?y Justice WoJfe in
·Graham v. Jolvnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P (2) 630, on page
359 of the Utah Report:
"A defendant is exceeding the lawful restricted sp·e.ed limit; another driver, the· plaintiff, fails
to keep a p·roper lookout and crosses the path of
the oncoming car and gets stalled on its path.
Both up to that point might he guilty of negligence
and neither he able to recove·r against the other.
But if the oncoming driver, realizing the situation
of the plaintiff, had a clear opportunity ·to avoid
the accident and faile~d to utilize it, that counts
just as if the plaintiff had not been negligent and
the defendant had been."
In the Mangus v. Olsen ca:se, sup~ra, where the evidence would sustain a finding that the deceased had proceeded 19 feet from the curb of a street into the street at a
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speed less than three miles per hour, and the defendant
approached the point of impact at a speed of t'vent.y miles
per hour, and the defendant eould have stopped his car
had he seen deceased crossing, Judge Wade in a concurring opinion on page 516 of the Utah Report said:
Hln the present case, both defendant and decedent were guilty of the san1e kind of negligence·.
Each negligently failed to observe the· approach
of the other. The negligence, of each continued to
the time of the accident and either of them could
have avoided the accident within a very short
time prior to the impact had he observed the ap·proach of the other. There does not appear to be
any good reaS'on why the last clear chance doctrine
should allow a recovery under these circumstances."
In this case the defendant could have avoided the
accident up until almost the very instant of the impact
had he been observing the proper care for his own safety.
If, as argued by the plaintiff, he was on the' p·oint of entering the intersection as defendant approached, he needed only to have stepp·ed back. If he was on the point of
leaving, he needed only to have hurried. Therefore, his
negligence did continue up to and at least contribute to
the impact.
Moreover, the doctrine of last cl~ear chance also requires that the defendant be aware of defendant's position and able to do something about it. As was said in
Compton v .Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Compa.n;y, supra,
"\vhere deceased was killed while crossing a railroad
track:
"The rule approved by this court where plain-
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tiff is negligently inattentive: and has subjected
himself to risk o{ harm as provided in ·section.
480 is that he can recover from a defendant who
knew .of his situation and· realized or had. reason
to realize that plaintiff is inattentive, and unlikely
to disco:ver his. peril in time~ to a void harm, and
thereafter is negligent in failing to use ordinary
care with the! means at his disposal to avoid harming him. For the rule: to be otherwise, we would
again only have the ne·gligence of the plaintiff and
defendant co~curring together to proximately
cause the injury. * * *
"In the principal case in order for plaintiffs
to make out a. case of last clear chance, it would
have been necessary that the defendant know
that decedent was in ~ position of per1l, and in ·
addition have realized or had reason to realize
that decedent was inattentive ~and un~ely to
discover her peril in time to avoid the threatened
harm, and de/enda.nt must thereafter have fa.iled
to exe:rcise reasonable care in· connection with #s
then existing ability to avoid harming decedent."
(Italics ours.)
Not ·only must the: evidence· show that the defendant
had an opportunity to avoid the. accident after he becomes
or has reason to he aware of plaintiff's negligence, but
. the opportunity must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.
The case of Gra.ha.m. v. Johnson, 166 Pac. (2d) 2~0,
109 Utah_ 346, involved the. opportunity . of a defendant to
avoid injury to a thirteen year old boy playing hall in
the street The court s:a.id:

"* * * But in the last clear chance doct.rine the
word 'clear' ha:s significance. In a case such as
. 34
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this when both parties are more or less rapidly
changing their positions the evidence must be
clear ~and convincing that the party when it is
claimed could have avoided the accident had a
'clear' chance to do so.
hConstruing any reasonable combination of
facts on this theory of the. case most favorable to
Gary, if Darlene 'vas coming ·at 10 miles an hour
down the extreme west side of the street and Donald shouted at Gary setting him off toward thH car
when he, as must in such case be inferred, was
not then in danger, the jury must be instructed
· that it shoul'd be cle·arly convinced in such case
that she was far enough north of him as to give
her a clear chance to avoid the accident. That
is to say, she must have had. a clear and amp~le
opportunity to seng.e the danger into which he
was coming and clearly have had time after that
to apply her brakes and stop the car after she
sensed or should reasonably have sensed.that he
was putting himself into danger. Otherwise there
is no room for the app.Jieation of the last clear
chance doctrine. One should not be held liable for
failing to avord the effect of the .other's ne!gligence
in a situation where it is speculative aS" to whether
he was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it.
In a situation where both parties are on the move·
the significance of the word 'clear' is most important. Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding
the effect of one's negligence on a ·party not negligent. That party's negligence only arises when it
is definitely established that there was ample time
and opportunity to avoid the accident which was
not taken advantage of."
The best evidence as to whether defendant had a
clear chance to avoid injury to .the plaintiff after plaintiff
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had p·la.ced _himself in .a p·erilous position and· defendant
had become aware of or had to be aware of his situation
and what defendant did to avoid the accident is the testimony of defendant himself. He testified to the s:cene
which confronted him as fol1ows (R. 286 - Tr. 271) :
"Q. Well, what was the first thing you did
s.ee that caused you any - caused you concern, if
anything~

A.

Well, I was just driving down the road,
wer~n't saying anything, just driving, and I seen
this-- well, I seen Mr. Cox now. I seen him when
he s,tep·ped into the lights. And -that is the first
time I seen him.

Q.

What lights do you have reference to~

A. The headlights on the car. He stepped
in to the lane, where the lights go the strongest,
down the center of the lane.

Q. ·w·hich direction was he going~
A. .He was he·ading across the stree!t west. .

Q.

Did you see him at any time face! the car~

A. No, I couldn't see him. All I could see
after I did ·see him was. a silhouette. The~e was no
form there ·at all, just a dark silhouette.

Q. When you first saw this silhouette in
front of you, I will ask you how far ahead of you
it was, ap·peared to be,_ as far as your vision was
concerned~

A. W eil, I could s,ee the full length of him,
and possibly - p.robably .two or thrHe· fe~e-t of highway. I couldn't specify as to how much highway,
but I could see the full height of the man.
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Q. Was he on the move, or was he standing
still, or do you know'?
...-\.. ,V. ell, his leg-s were apart, I could see and I never seen him until he came into view into
the lights from the side."
On page '287 of the record (Tr. 272) defendant testified:
"Q. And "That did you do if anything when
you saw him~
\V. ell, I could see him stepp,ing to the
west, so I immediately swerved the car to the east,
.A..

which would have been my left.

Q. Were y.our hands on the wheel during
this

time~

A.

Yes.

Q. Had they been on the wheel prior to the
time you

A.

swerved~

Yes.

Q. And did you do anything else, other than ·
swerve· your car~
A. Well, at the same. time I swerved, I probably depressed the clutch at the same time. It all
happened at the same time. I swerved, depressed
the clutch, and applied the brakes a small amount.
I don't think I ap-plied them at all completely, because of the force of stopping and turning, it
didn't seem reasonable.
You did ap·ply your brakes, you put your
foot on the brakes ~
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

As soon as you could~
37
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A.

Yes."

In discussing this. aspect of the case~ appellant makes
a numbHr of.assumptions not warranted by the evidence.
For e:xample, on page 45 of his brief, appellant asks the
court to assume1 defendant became aware of pJaintiff's
situation before plaintiff entered the defendant's lane of
travet The record contains no such testimony either expressly or by implication.
Clearly, this evidence portrays a situation where ·
no further act of the defendant ciOuld have avoided the
accident. The p·laintiff was immediately in front of defendant when he first saw him. It was already too late to
avoid the collision, even though the. defendant attempted
to do so by· swerving to the left and braking his automobile.
Even assuming. defendant became aware or had
reason, to he aware of plaintiff when he entered the defendant's lane, defendant had no clear opportunity to
avoid the collision. Police Officer Mower testified that
at a speed .qf 40 miles per hour, it would require 126
feet to stop· an automobile (R. 140). Assu:rnllig that decedent· was walking at an ave·rage sp·eed of 4.1 feet per
second (R. ------) and tha:t he had reached the middle of
the lane when the impact occurred, it would take roughly
one ·and one-half seoonds for him to re·ach the middle of
the 12 foot lane (Ex. A) .. OffiC'er Mowe-r s~ated t1hat an
automobile moving 40 miles· p·er hour would traveil 58
feet per second (R. 141). At the beginning ·of the· one and
one-half seconds which elapsed, assUming· that decedent
had reached the middle of the lane when the accident oc38
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cnrred, the automobile would be 89 feet from the point of
impact, too close to stop even had thH brakes been appJied
at that \ery instant.
The case at bar and the Mingus case are-close,ly similar as regards the doctrine of last clear chance·. The
difference would seem to be only that the case at bar
presents a much clearer factual situation for denying the
application of the doctrine. It is readily seen that in
this case the decedent was only a few ste·ps (6 fe,et at
the· most) into the defendant's lane of travel when the
accide~t occurred, whereas in the Mingus case the decedent was 19 feet from the curb and the defendant's ve~
hlcle moving only 20 mil·es per hour, whereas in this case
the defendant's automobile was traveling between 35 and·
40 miles per hour. And further, in the Mingus case, the
decedent was proceeding between. the marked lines of a
crosswalk at an intersection. In the case at bar the decedent was walking across a thvough highway in violation of statute an.d at a point where the p-resence of a
pedestrian could not be reasonably anticip·ated or foreseen by an automobile driver. And too, in the l\iingus
case the intersection was lit by a street light. In the case
at bar the evidence is that the area in the vicinity of the
accident was darker than surrounding territory.
The negligence of the decedent was continuing in this
ease as in the Mingus case and it was wholly within the
power of decedent at any p-oint to extricate himself from
Iris perilous position had he exercised the requi'site degree of care. As in the Mingus case, the doctrine of_last
clear chance has no application to the facts of this case,
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C·ONCLUSION
In summarizing the evidence and the law of this case
we can do no better than the Judge who heard the evidence.. The following is taken from his remarks upon
directing a verdiet, beginning on page 345 (Tr. 330) of
the reeord:
"In the light of the recent deeisions ·of our
Court, I feel that these· things appear quite certainly: The deceased had gone seven or eight
feet beyond the safety center lines. There· were
approximately three feet between the two double
lines. The traffic 1~anes are 12 feet wide. Th~
Court has indicated before that there could he no
question of negligence on the part of the deceased
. in leaving the curb, cros'Sing the stree't and stopping and turning back •across the safety zone.
The evidence e·stablishes beyond any per adventure of a doubt whatsoever that the defendant was
traveling in the center lane of southbound traffic,
or in lane two. Thus, in order for the deceased to
arrive in any position of peril, he, had to travel
approximately 22 feet.
"There isn't- any indication that he was ·eitheT
hurrying, or that he was walking slugishly, and
taking the rate of four and one tenth foot per
second, it would require him approximately five
and six te·nths seeonds to return from the place
where he stopped and reverse·d his direction, to ·
reach the line of lane number two.
"The plaintiff herself, the widow, and 1\Irs.
Ferre, had called to the· decedent, and had seen
him stop and turn to come back. They didn't watch
him any further. Mrs. F·erre turned to open the
door-no, Mrs. Cox turned to open the door of thf~
car to get in, when she heard the· emergency occurring. The witness, Mr. F'erre, saw the deceased
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stop and turn and 'valk back, and excepting for his
glancing a'Yay for maybe a second or two, he said,
he 'Ya:tched hi1n all the 'Yay, and state,d that he
sa"~ the point of impart. He didn't even imply any
erratic, sudden action on the part of the decedent
That fact, considered in reference to the time
required, "~ould n1ake it inconsistent to believe
that there 'vas any appreciable stopping of the
decedent in number one lane of traffic.
"'Now in the :Jlingus case our Supreme C~ourt
not only 'Yeighed the testimony of plaintiff, but
also 'Yeighed the testimony of the defense, and had
before it exactly the same problem·that faces this
Court at this moment.
'"From those things that I have now recited,
the Court feels, even without any defense evidence, that to submit the que~stion of whether or
not the decedent continued oblivious to the ap-·
proach of the defendant's automobile., would submit it only on a guess and a conjecture, and
couldn't be supported by the evidence.
"Then if we weigh into the scales the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses, we find
that the· defendant testified to seeing ·a shadow
moving into the lane in which he was proceeding.
The other two boys with him-you may call them
biased witnesses in a certain respect, but you
couldn't call them interested in the outcome of the
case - they were friends. But allowing for tha:t,
they cor~oborate the defendant's testimony, that
the decedent was stepping into the lane of traffic
before there was any action taken by the car.
"Now the physical evidence further strengthens in this : That the impact-and considering
only the physical evidence-could not have oc-
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curred, regardless of which position you may believe the body came to rest in, immediately at
the place where, the chrome pieces were found.
"The reeord establishes without any possible
question of a doubt that prior to the car making
any turns or the driver observing any emergency,
it was going in the neighborhood of 35 ·miles an
hour. 'l'he only evidence of rubber marks on the
dry· cement indicE1tes that there was very little, if
any at all, braking, in the skid marks. Bothe car
was moving at substantially 30 to 35 miles an hour
during the time of the action occurring from the
first con~ct with the decedent's body.
"It is absolutely undisp,uted that the body,
in addition to being. struck, was thrown hack over
· the radiator, striking with such force to dent the
. hood and then sliding marks as it went off to the
side. That sort of action does. not occur with e(Xplosive ·timing. And in the meantime, the car
was . p~rogressing at about, roughly, around 30
miles an hour, in its. direction toward the double
center line and acroS's to where it came to rest.
"In the most generous possible interp,retation for the plaintiff, and considering the course
of those marks with respect to the lateral lines
of the traffic lane, considering that th~· defendant
had been traveling approximately in the center
of ·that lane, from the faet that he was able to see
the side line on the driver's side a.s he· came along,
and in head, and while he wa.s looking out through
the window of his door, and the· fact that the· car
is in excess of five feet in width, three feet is. a
reasonable estin1ate of the distance between his
car and the side, line in order that he might so see.
Five feet would be eight feet. The deceased struck
not on the extreme -right corner of the car, bu-c
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struck the grill of the radiator on the right side,
and near the right front headlight, from which
the chrome 'Yas broken. The fact that the decar, the hood, indic.eased went up on top of
cates that the prhna.ry force was practically in
the direct line of the travel of the car, rathe:r than
in a slanting line. The natural law of the breakage of the chrome under such circumstances would
cause the chrome to proceed furthHr along the line
of the force that 'vas propelling it at the time.

the

"That coupled with the fact that it required
the time to pass over on top of the hood and fall
off, whether it reached the position on the highway described by the officer or the p·osition on the
highway described by the plaintiff's witnesses,
required time sufficient that at that rate· of sp·eed,
definitely s·hows the occurrence of the imp·a:ct within, and well within, the number two lane of traffic,
far enough so that the deceased, if he had jumped
in head, would have had to jump anywhere frorr1
seven to eight feet. If he walked straight into i't,
of course, he was negligent If he jump;ed into it,
he'd have to stop. The calculation of the times,
the positions, in the Court's judgment, leaves the
inescapable conclusion that as a matter of law
the de~eased was wholly oblivious to anything that
was going on around him, so far as traffic was
concerned; that he walked directly from the place
\Vhere he stopped and reversed his course, into
the number two lane ; that he did not see, or if he
did see, that he did not heed the approach of the
defendant's car, and that therefore he was negligent as a matter of law.
"And the last clear chance doctrine, not being
available in this case, his ne·gligence proxirnately
contribute·d to produce his death as a n1atter of
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law, and therefore, as a mat ter of law, the plain~
tiff cannot recover."
1
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